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EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM AND 
THE RELIABILITY OF OUR COGNITIVE FACULTIES 
David Silver 
Alvin Plantinga has argued that the evolutionary naturalist has a self-under-
mining set of beliefs. The first premise, the Probability Thesis, states that the 
probability that our cognitive faculties are generally reliable given the truth 
of evolutionary naturalism is either low or inscrutable. The second premise, 
the Defeater Thesis, states that the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of 
the Probability Thesis thereby obtains a defeater for her belief that her cogni-
tive faculties are reliable. Plantinga's argument for the Defeater Thesis is an 
argument by analogy. I argue that it is not obviously the case that 
Plantinga's analogical argument is successful; and, I point out what needs to 
be done before we can judge whether or not the argument is successful. 
I. Introduction 
Over the last decade Alvin Plantinga has argued that the naturalist (i.e., the 
person who rejects the existence of supernatural beings such as God) who 
accepts evolutionary theory has a self-underminillg set of beliefs.! My aim 
in this paper is to examine a key premise in this argument. 
Before looking at the argument let me introduce a few abbreviations. Let 
us refer to naturalism as N and to evolutionary theory as E. We will refer to 
the conjunction of N and E as 'evolutionary naturalism'. In addition we 
will refer to the proposition that our cognitive faculties are reliable as R. 
With these abbreviations in hand we can examine the general structure 
of Plantinga's argument. The argument begins with the Probability 
Thesis which states that the probability that R is true given the truth of N 
and E is either low or inscrutable. The case for the Probability Thesis, 
briefly, is this: supposing Nand E to be true, we find that human beings 
are the product of an undirected evolutionary process. But, so far as we 
can tell, the probability that a creature with this sort of provenance would 
have generally reliable cognitive faculties is either low or inscrutable. And 
thus we must conclude that the probability that our own cognitive faculties 
are reliable given N & E is either low or inscrutable.2 
The next step in the argument is the Defeater Thesis. It holds that an 
evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of the Probability Thesis has a 
defeater for her belief in R; that is, without further information, it is irra-
tional for her to continue to believe that her cognitive faculties are reliable. 
The rest of the argument is that (a) this defeater for R is itself undefeat-
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able, and (b) in virtue of having this undefeatable defeater for R the evolu-
tionary naturalist has an undefeatable defeater for all of her beliefs, includ-
ing her beliefs in N & E. Thus, it is irrational for the evolutionary naturalist 
to believe in evolutionary naturalism once she is apprised of the 
Probability Thesis, and this shows her position to be self-defeating. 
The focus of this paper will be on Plantinga's argument for the Defeater 
Thesis. In the argument he presents us with a number of cases containing 
agents who are clearly facing a defeater for some of their beliefs. He then 
urges us to see the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of the 
Probability Thesis as being in a relevantly similar position and thus facing 
a defeater for her belief in R. 
I shall argue that it is unclear whether the evolutionary naturalist really 
is in a relevantly similar position to the agents in the analogical cases. And, 
in so doing, I shall outline what we need to know in order to determine 
whether this argument from analogy is ultimately successful. 
We shall proceed as follows: first, we shall look at the analogical cases 
that Plantinga offers. Next, I will make explicit the general principle which 
explains why the agents in these analogical cases are clearly facing a 
defeater for some of their beliefs. With this general principle in hand we 
can then tum to see whether the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of 
the Probability Thesis is in a relevantly similar position. 
As we shall see, this issue turns on whether she is in a position where 
she can rationally believe that her belief in R is formed in a warranted fash-
ion, i.e. in accordance with her epistemic design plan. If she is not in a posi-
tion to rationally believe this then she will be in a relevantly similar posi-
tion to the agents in the analogical cases and thereby will have a defeater 
for her belief in R. 
I shall argue, however, that for all that Plantinga says it appears that the 
evolutionary naturalist is in a position where she can rationally hold that 
her belief in R is produced in a warranted fashion. She can believe this 
either on the basis that her belief in R is produced in a basic way (i.e. not on 
the basis of any other beliefs) or on the basis that her belief in R is produced 
by an inductive inference from other beliefs. If I am right about this then 
Plantinga's argument for the Defeater Thesis is at best incomplete. And, 
unless it can be shown that the evolutionary naturalist is rationally 
debarred from thinking that her belief in R is produced in a warranted 
fashion then Plantinga's argument for the Defeater Thesis fails, and thus so 
does his larger argument against evolutionary naturalism. 
II. The Argument by Analogy for the Defeater Thesis 
A. The Analogical Cases 
In this section we will examine the analogical cases that Plantinga appeals 
to in his argument for the Defeater Thesis: 
• The Widget Cases 
• The Freudian Theist Cases 
• The Space Radio Case 
• The Brain-in-a-Vat Case 
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The Widget Cases 
In the first widget case a visitor to a factory sees an assembly line carrying 
apparently red widgets. She is told by the shop superintendent that these 
widgets are being irradiated by a variety of red lights which make it possible 
to detect otherwise undetectable hairline cracks; the red color of the widgets, 
he says, should thus not be taken as an indication of their true color. In fact, 
he says, there are relatively few red-colored widgets.3 (WPF 230) 
What should the visitor believe about the color of the widgets in this sit-
uation? Relative to all of her evidence, she should take it that the probabili-
ty that a widget is red given that it looks is red is fairly low. And this fact 
gives her a defeater for any belief she forms to the effect that a particular 
widget is red. 
Consider now the second widget case. In this case, after her encounter 
with the superintendent, the visitor is told by a vice-president that the 
superintendent is not trustworthy on the matter of the color of the wid-
gets. The visitor, however, does not know whom to trust-the superin-
tendent, or his detractor. 
What should the visitor believe about the color of the widgets in this sit-
uation? For all that she knows the probability that a widget is red given 
that it looks red could be very low; but also, for all that she knows, it could 
be high. Plantinga maintains (quite plausibly) that in this situation she 
should be agnostic about the deliverances of her visual perception so far as 
color detection is concerned; moreover, he maintains that she thus has a 
defeater for any color beliefs about particular widgets she obtains by 
observing the assembly line. 
The Freudian Theist Cases 
In the second set of cases a devoted theist reads Freud and thereby 
comes to think that her belief in the existence of God is produced by wish 
fulfillment. (WPF 229-30) She then considers the probability that wish ful-
fillment is a reliable belief-forming process. In the first Freudian theist case 
she estimates the probability as rather low. In this case, Plantinga con-
tends, the theist has a straightforward undercutting defeater for any belief 
she takes to have been produced by wish fulfillment, including her belief 
in the existence of God. 
In the second version of this example, the theist finds that she simply is 
unable to make an estimate of the probability that wish fulfillment is a reli-
able belief-forming process. For all that she knows it might be a very unreli-
able process; but, for all that she knows it might be a highly reliable process. 
What should the Freudian theist believe about the existence of God in 
this case? Given her agnosticism about the reliability of wish fulfillment 
Plantinga plausibly maintains that she thus has a defeater for any belief she 
takes to be produced by that belief-forming mechanism, including for her 
belief in the existence of God. 
The Space Radio Case 
In the third case you are to imagine that on a space mission to an 
unknown planet you find a radio-like device which periodically emits sen-
tences in English only about topics of which you have no knowledge. "A bit 
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unduly impressed with your find," Plantinga relates, "you initially form the 
opinion that this quasi radio speaks the truth." (WCB 224) Suppose, howev-
er, that after a bit of cool reflection you realize that you know nothing at all 
about the purpose of the instrument, or who or what constructed it. In this 
case, Plantinga says, "the probability that this device is reliable given what 
you know about it, is low or inscrutable; and this gives you a defeater for 
your initial belief that the instrument indeed speaks the truth." (WCB 237) 
Moreover, we might add, there would be a defeater for any belief that you 
formed solely in virtue of the pronouncements of the space radio. 
The Brain-in-a-V at Case 
In the final case you begin to consider the possibility that you are a brain 
in a vat being subjected to various experiments by Alpha Centaurian cog-
nitive scientists in such a way that your cognitive faculties are not reliable. 
You think that this is a genuine possibility; however, you cannot make any 
estimate of the probability that your faculties are reliable: "as far as you 
can tell, the probability could be anywhere between 0 and 1." Plantinga 
concludes: "Then too you have a defeater for your natural belief that your 
cognitive faculties are reliable. (WCB 238) 
B. The Unsubstantiated Source Principle 
In each of these cases Plantinga contends (quite rightly, I think) that the 
agent in question has a defeater for some of her beliefs. Plantinga then 
urges us to see the case of the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of 
the Probability Hypothesis as being in a relevantly similar position-she 
too has a defeater for one of her beliefs, and in particular, for her belief that 
her cognitive faculties are reliable. 
Although it might be true that the evolutionary naturalist is in a rele-
vantly similar position I submit that this is not obviously the case. In order 
to tell whether it really is the case we need, at the very least, to uncover the 
general principle which explains why the agents in the analogical cases are 
clearly facing defeat, and then see how the general principle applies to the 
case of the evolutionary naturalist. 
Let us then examine the analogical cases in order to find this general 
principle. We shall start with the first Freudian theist case. There the theist 
realizes that, given all of her evidence, the probability that the cognitive 
faculty which produced her belief in God is reliable is rather low. And it is 
this belief that provides the defeater for her belief in God. With this in 
mind we might propose a general principle called the Low Reliability 
(LR) principle of defeat: 
(LR) S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence, 
S takes as low the probability that the source of p is reliable. 
Principle LR straightforwardly explains why there is a defeater in the first 
Freudian theist case. But, a quick inspection will verify that it does not 
explain why there is a defeater in any of the other cases. Consider especial-
ly the first widget case. 
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In that case the visitor is told by the superintendent that the probability 
that a widget is red given that it looks red is rather low. What the example 
does not stipulate (nor does the example depend on) is that the visitor 
actually forms the belief that her perceptual faculties concerning widgets 
are unreliable in the circumstances at hand. Thus, principle LR as it cur-
rently stands cannot explain why there is a defeater in this case. 
But what does explain why there is a such a defeater? One natural sug-
gestion is that the existence of the defeater has something to do with what 
the visitor might rationally believe in this case. To flesh this suggestion out, 
though, we need to (a) explain which of the requirements of rationality are 
relevant in this matter, and (b) explain exactly what kind of rationality is 
being invoked here. 
In regards to which rational requirements are relevant to explaining the 
presence of a defeater, one might be tempted to say that the visitor is ratio-
nally required to form the belief that her perceptual faculties concerning 
widgets are unreliable; but, this seems to be too demanding a requirement 
of rationality: she might with perfect rationality fail to form the belief that 
her perceptual faculties are unreliable. However, she may not with perfect 
rationality deny that that her color-detecting faculties are unreliable in the 
circumstances at hand. And, let me suggest, it is this fact about rationality 
that explains why she has a defeater for color beliefs concerning widgets. 
In regards to what kind of rationality is being invoked here let us tum to 
Plantinga's distinction between internal and external rationality. Roughly 
speaking, internal rationality deals with matters" downstream" from expe-
rience, and external rationality deals with matters "upstream" from experi-
ence. (See pp. 110-112) In the case at hand the relevant irrationality is 
downstream from experience and is thus a matter of internal rationality. In 
particular, the internal irrationality stems from the fact that in order to be 
internally rational an agent's beliefs must have a requisite degree of coher-
ence. (112) As Plantinga notes there is much work to be done concerning 
how much coherence is required for internal rationality; however, I take it 
that what drives our thought that there is a defeater in the first widget case 
is the sense that the visitor would not meet the minimal degree of coher-
ence required for internal rationality if she were to deny that the probabili-
ty that her color-detecting faculties are reliable in the circumstances at 
hand is rather low. 
With this discussion in mind let me propose that the following revision 
of the Low Reliability principle explains why there is a defeater in the first 
widget case: 
(LR') S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence, 
S takes as low, or it would be internally irrational for S to deny as 
low, the probability that the source of p is reliable. 4 
Principle LR', besides being intuitively plausible, successfully explains 
why there is a defeater in the first widget case and the first Freudian theist 
case. But, it does not help us with the other cases. Consider, for example, 
the second Freudian theist case. 
There the theist realizes that the probability that the cognitive faculty 
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which produced her belief in God is reliable is, for her, inscrutable. And it 
is this belief that provides the defeater for her belief in God. This case sug-
gests the need for a cognate to the original LR principle. Let us call this the 
Inscrutable Source (IS) principle of defeat: 
(IS) S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence, S 
takes as inscrutable the probability that the source of p is reliable. 
The IS principle plausibly explains why there is a defeater in the second 
theist case. It also works with the brain-in-a-vat case. There you realize 
that, given everything you know, the probability that your belief-forming 
faculties are reliable is, for you, inscrutable; and, it is this belief that 
(according to the IS principle) provides the defeater for any belief, includ-
ing R, which you take to have been generated by your cognitive faculties. 
The IS principle explains why there is a defeater in the second theist case 
and in the brain-in-a-vat case; however, it does not explain why there is a 
defeater in the two remaining cases (the second widget case and the space 
radio case). To see why this is so let us look at the second widget case. 
There the visitor to the factory does not know whom to trust-the superin-
tendent or the vice-president-and this gives her a defeater for her color 
beliefs about the widgets. What the example does not stipulate, nor does it 
depend on, is that the visitor has any beliefs about the reliability of her per-
ceptual faculties; thus, principle IS does not explain why she has a defeater 
for her color beliefs concerning the widgets. To explain why there is a such 
a defeater we need to revise the IS principle in a way similar to the way we 
revised the LR principle. This suggests the following principle: 
(IS') S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence, S 
takes as inscrutable, or it would be internally irrational for S to 
deny as inscrutable, the probability that the source of p is reliable. 
Let us see how IS' deals with the remaining space radio case. There you 
realize that you know nothing at all about the purpose of the space radio; 
but, the example does not stipulate that you come to any beliefs about the 
reliability of the space radio; thus, the original IS principle cannot explain 
why you have a defeater for its pronouncements; but, IS' can explain why 
there is a defeater. This is because given your cognitive situation-includ-
ing the fact that you have just come to reflect upon the reliability of the 
space radio as well as upon the fact that you know nothing about its ori-
gins, purpose or provenance-it is internally irrational for you to deny that 
the probability that the space radio is reliable is, for you, inscrutable. 
Principle IS' appears then to both be intuitively plausible, and combined 
with principle LR' can explain why there is a defeater in each of the ana-
logical cases. Indeed, we may combine IS' and LR' into a single principle 
which I call the Unsubstantiated Source (US) principle of defeat: 
(US) S has a defeater for the belief p if, relative to all of her evidence, 
S takes as low or inscrutable, or it would be internally irrational 
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for S to deny as low or inscrutable, the probability that the 
source of p is reliable. 
It is this US principle, I contend, which explains why the agents in the ana-
logical cases are clearly facing defeat for some of their beliefs. 
III. The US principle and the Defeater Thesis 
A. What will decide the matter? 
In the last section I argued that it is the US principle which explains why the 
agents in the analogical cases are clearly facing a defeater for some of their 
beliefs. With this principle in hand we can now see how it applies to the 
case of the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of the Probability Thesis. 
This issue turns on certain facts about what she might believe about the cog-
nitive faculty which has produced her belief in R, or what we might call her 
R-faculty. In particular it depends on whether she believes, or it would be 
internally irrational for her to deny that, relative to all of her evidence, the 
probability that her R-faculty is reliable is either low or inscrutable. 
If any of these disjuncts hold then the US principle shows that she has a 
defeater for her belief in R. Note, however, that the Probability Thesis 
states merely that relative to her belief in evolutionary naturalism the probabili-
ty that her cognitive faculties (which certainly include the R-faculty) are 
reliable is either low or inscrutable. This is not one of the relevant dis-
juncts. But, someone might claim, one of the relevant disjuncts follows as a 
direct consequence of the evolutionary naturalist's being made aware of 
the Probability Thesis. In particular someone might claim that it is internal-
ly irrational for the evolutionary naturalist who is apprised of the 
Probability Thesis to deny that relative to all of her evidence the probabili-
ty that her cognitive faculties are reliable is either low or inscrutable. 
Why think this is so? Someone might think so on the basis of the fol-
lowing principle concerning the degree of coherence among one's beliefs 
that is necessary in order for one to be internally rational: 
The Attended No-Reason (ANR) condition: if agent S's attention is 
brought to bear on whether her belief B is formed in a warranted 
way, and it is internally irrational for her to accept any reason for 
thinking that B is warranted, then it is internally irrational for her to 
continue to believe B.5 
Let us reflect for a moment on the role that attention is playing in this prin-
ciple. The suggestion here is that the internal rationality of an agent's 
acceptance of B may be affected simply by her coming to reflect on 
whether B is formed in a warranted way. Before reflecting on this matter it 
might be internally rational for her to accept B even though it is not inter-
nally rational for her to accept any reason for thinking that B is warranted. 
Once her attention is brought to bear on the question of whether B is war-
ranted, though, the ANR principle declares that it is internally irrational for 
her to continue to believe B. 
The ANR principle has a certain degree of intuitive plausibility. In addi-
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tion, it neatly explains how an evolutionary naturalist is supposed to go 
from an awareness of the Probability Thesis to the possession of a defeater 
for R: reflection on the Probability Thesis brings the evolutionary natural-
ist's attention to bear on whether her belief in R is formed in a warranted 
way. And, supposing that there simply is no internally rational reason for 
the evolutionary naturalist to think that R is formed in a warranted way, 
then it turns out that reflection on the Probability Thesis leads the evolu-
tionary naturalist to have a defeater for her belief in R. 
It is this appeal to the ANR principle along with the supposition that 
there is no internally rational reason for the evolutionary naturalist to 
believe that R is formed in a warranted way that I believe drives 
Plantinga's case against evolutionary naturalism. I shall accept the ANR 
principle. But is the supposition that there is no internally rational reason 
for the evolutionary naturalist to believe that R is formed in a warranted 
way well-founded? In order to demonstrate this there is some hard work 
to do. At the very least it is necessary to examine all likely accounts that 
the evolutionary naturalist might offer for thinking that her belief in R was 
formed in a warranted way-Leo that her R-faculty is part of her epistemic 
design plan. If all such accounts are found to be internally irrational for the 
evolutionary naturalist to accept then we can conclude that Plantinga's 
analogical argument for the Defeater Thesis is successful; however, if we 
find that it is internally rational for the evolutionary nahlralist to believe 
that her R-faculty is indeed part of her epistemic design plan then the US 
principle will not ground the Defeater Thesis. 
In the rest of the paper I will discuss two reasons that the evolutionary 
naturalist might offer to support the view that her belief in R is produced 
in a warranted fashion. One of these reasons takes it that R is accepted in a 
basic way, i.e. it doesn't get its warrant by way of being accepted on the evi-
dential basis of other propositions. The other account takes it that R is 
accepted on the basis of inductive inference, and thus not in the basic way. 
My aim is to show thatjor all that Plantinga says these reasons are inter-
nally rationally acceptable for the evolutionary naturalist. If this is right 
then Plantinga's case for the Defeater Thesis is at best incomplete until it is 
shown how in they are in fact not internally rationally acceptable. 
B. The Maximal Warrant Approach 
In this section we will discuss the "Maximal Warrant Approach" that an 
evolutionary nahualist might employ in order to show that her belief in R 
is warranted. The Maximal Warrant Objection takes it that it can be inter-
nally rational for an evolutionary naturalist to think that R gets its warrant 
in a basic way, i.e. it doesn't get its warrant by way of being accepted on the 
evidential basis of other propositions. Given this fact, it can be internally 
rational for the evolutionary naturalist to think that R has so much intrinsic 
warrant "that it can't be defeated-Qr at any rate can't be defeated by the 
fact that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable." (ND, p. 16) 
Might an internally rational evolutionary naturalist think that her belief 
in R has a great deal of warrant because it is produced in a basic way? 
Plantinga argues that this is not the case. His argument depends on his 
understanding of how it is that an evolutionary naturalist might come to 
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think that R is produced in a basic way. The idea is that a belief in R is part 
of the human design plan because if an agent doubts R she is thereby head-
ed for epistemic disaster. (ND, p. 53) On this reading R is produced in a 
basic way as part of the human design plan; however, since it is not pro-
duced by that part of the human design plan that is directly aimed at truth 
(but rather at that part of the human design plan which is directly aimed at 
the avoidance of epistemic disaster) it has no warrant. (d. WPF, p. 40) 
What Plantinga's response shows here is that the Maximal Warrant 
Objection is acceptable only if it can be internally rational for an evolution-
ary naturalist to think that her R-faculty is contained in that part of her 
design plan which is aimed directly at the truth. I am not sure if an inter-
nally rational evolutionary naturalist could think this after fully thinking 
through the issues involved here; indeed, I am rather skeptical.6 But, for all 
that I say here, and more importantly for all that Plantinga says, it could be 
internally rational for an evolutionary naturalist to believe this; and, so 
long as we have no conclusive reason to think to the contrary, Plantinga's 
case against the evolutionary naturalist is at best incomplete. 
C. The Inductive Inference Approach 
Let us suppose, however, that we could conclusively show that it was 
not internally rational for the evolutionary naturalist to think that her belief 
in R was warranted because it was produced in a basic way. Even then I 
would claim that Plantinga's case against the evolutionary naturalist 
would be incomplete. This is because the evolutionary naturalist might 
think that her belief in R was formed in a warranted way insofar as it is the 
product of an inductive inference. 
If an evolutionary naturalist could believe this in an internally rational 
fashion then it too would undermine Plantinga's case against evolutionary 
naturalism. But can she? She could if she could believe the following in an 
internally rational fashion: 
(a) That her belief in R is produced by a faculty of inductive infer-
ence,and 
(b) That her faculty of inductive inference is a highly reliable belief-
forming mechanism. 
Let us see how she might make good on these claims. Consider the follow-
ing chain of reasoning that she might go through: "I have many beliefs 
and while some are undoubtedly false the vast majority are true. 
Moreover, all and only these beliefs are the product of my cognitive facul-
ties. So, most of the beliefs generated by my cognitive faculties are true. 
And, the best explanation of why most of the beliefs generated by my cog-
nitive faculties are true is that my cognitive faculties are in fact highly reli-
able. And, making an inference to the best explanation, I am entitled to 
believe that my cognitive faculties are highly reliable." According to this 
chain of reasoning the evolutionary naturalist believes that the relevant R-
faculty is the faculty of inductive inference. 
She continues by demonstrating that this faculty of inductive inference is 
itself highly reliable. She also demonstrates this via an inductive inference: 
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"I have had many beliefs generated by inductive inference. And, it turns out 
that the vast majority of these beliefs are true. The best explanation of why 
this is so is that I have a reliable faculty of inductive inference. And, making 
an inference to the best explanation, I am entitled to believe that my faculty 
of inductive inference is highly reliable." Using this form of reasoning the 
evolutionary naturalist comes to the belief that she has a highly reliable fac-
ulty of inductive inference, and thus that she has a highly reliable R-faculty. 
D. Plantinga's Reply: a second argument by analogy 
One might object to this appeal to inductive inference on the part of the 
evolutionary naturalist. Indeed, Plantinga anticipates this line of argument 
and states that: 
This argument ought to meet with less than universal acclaim. The 
friend of N & E does no better, arguing in this way, than the theist 
who argues that wish fulfillment must be a reliable belief-producing 
mechanism by running a similar argument with respect to the beliefs 
he holds that he thinks are produced by wish fulfillment. He does no 
better than the widget observer who, by virtue of a similar argument, 
continues to believe that those widgets are red, even after having been 
told by the building superintendent that they are irradiated by red 
light. Clearly this is not the method of true philosophy. (WPF 233) 
As we see here, Plantinga's argument against the evolutionary naturalist's 
use of inductive inference is also by analogy. He first points out that it is 
illegitimate for the Freudian theist to make use of inductive inference in 
defense of the reliability of her wish-fulfillment faculty, and that it is illegit-
imate for the widget factory visitor to make use of inductive inference in 
defense of the reliability of her color-detecting faculties. 
Although Plantinga does not make clear which of the two Freudian the-
ist cases, or which of the two widget cases he has in mind, let us agree that 
it would be illegitimate in each of these cases for the theist or the factory 
visitor to use inductive inference in the way that I suggested on behalf of 
the evolutionary naturalist. Consider, for example, the first widget case. 
In that case the factory visitor forms color beliefs about widgets on the 
basis of her color-detecting faculties; but, given what the shop superinten-
dent has told her it is internally irrational for her to deny that the probabili-
ty these faculties are reliable in the circumstances at hand is rather low. In 
this case it is illegitimate for the visitor to reason as follows: "I have many 
color beliefs about widgets, and while some are undoubtedly false the vast 
majority are true. The best explanation of why my color beliefs about wid-
gets are true is that my color-detecting faculties are reliable in the circum-
stances at hand. Thus, making an inference to the best explanation, I am 
entitled to believe that my color-detecting faculties are reliable in the cir-
cumstances at hand." 
I agree with Plantinga that it is illegitimate for the widget factory visitor 
to reason in this fashion. I also agree that it is similarly illegitimate for the 
agents in the second widget case, as well as in both of the Freudian theist 
cases to argue for the reliability of their respective faculties in this fashion. 
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But is the evolutionary naturalist in a relevantly similar position? If she is, 
then she is debarred from making use of inductive inference in defense of 
her belief in R, as well as in defense of her belief that her faculty of induc-
tive inference is highly reliable. 
But, I contend, it is far from obvious that the evolutionary naturalist is in 
a relevantly similar position to the Freudian theists and the widget factory 
visitors. And, I submit, in order to tell whether this is the case we need 
first to articulate the general principle which explains why it is illegitimate 
for the Freudian theists and the widget factory visitors to make use of 
inductive inference arguments in order to argue that their respective facul-
ties are reliable. Once we extract this general principle we can then see 
whether it applies to the evolutionary naturalist. 
So, what is this general principle? One might think that they are 
debarred from making use of such arguments simply because such argu-
ments are epistemically circular. Following Alston, we take an epistemical-
ly circular argument to be one that "involves a commitment to the con-
clusion as a presupposition of our supposing ourselves to be justified in 
holding the premises." (15) 
Let's consider an example. In the first widget case the factory visitor uses 
inductive inference to conclude that her color-detecting faculties are reliable 
in the circumstances at hand; however, the premises of the inductive infer-
ence argument that she gives can only be seen as true if she presupposes 
that these color-d.etecting faculties are in fact reliable in the circumstances at 
hand; thus, the argument clearly counts as epistemically circular. 
The evolutionary naturalist's use of inductive inference in favor of the 
reliability of her various cognitive faculties is similarly epistemically circu-
lar. (see p. 119) Her argument is epistemically circular in that she must 
commit to R as a presupposition of taking herself to be justified in holding 
the beliefs which serve as the basis of the inductive inference for R. And, 
her argument that inductive inference is a reliable means of forming beliefs 
is similarly epistemically circular. 
Given this discussion one might be tempted to say that the evolutionary 
naturalist is in a relevantly similar position to the Freudian theist and the 
widget factory visitor since they all engage in epistemically circular argu-
ments for their respective faculties? However, someone might object that 
there is a relevant difference between the epistemically circular arguments 
that the Freudian theist and the widget factory visitor engage in and the cir-
cular argument that the evolutionary naturalist engages in. And, the objec-
tor continues, the epistemically circular arguments of the Freudian theist 
and the widget factory visitor are epistemically objectionable in a way that 
the epistemically circular argument of the evolutionary naturalist is not. 
For example, someone might think that the epistemically circular argu-
ments of the Freudian theist and the widget factory visitor are unaccept-
able not merely because they are epistemically circular but rather because 
the US principle unambiguously shows that there is a defeater in these 
cases. It is the presence of these defeaters which explains why the 
Freudian theists' and the widget factory visitors' use of epistemically circu-
lar arguments is unacceptable. Indeed, one might put the general point in 
this way: 
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An epistemically circular argument for belief B is epistemically unac-
ceptable if B already faces a defeater; however, the epistemic circular-
ity of an argument for B is not necessarily a problem if B does not 
already face a defeater.8 
Although I think that this principle is true, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to argue for it. What is important for our purposes here is that if 
someone can believe in an internally rational fashion that it is valid, then she 
might rationally believe that her belief in R is warranted due to its being pro-
duced by a highly reliable faculty of inductive inference. This is because 
while an inductive argument for R might necessarily be epistemically circu-
lar, it is far from obvious that this kind of epistemic circularity is illegitimate. 
The point here is that it is unclear whether Plantinga's second argument 
by analogy successfully rules out the evolutionary naturalist's appeal to 
inductive inference. And, since this is true it is also unclear whether his 
first argument by analogy in favor of the Defeater Thesis is successful since 
it depends on the success of the second analogy. Finally, this leaves it 
unclear whether the Defeater Thesis can play its intended role in 
Plantinga's main argument against evolutionary naturalism. 
Let me conclude, then, by emphasizing what must be shown before we 
can conclude that Plantinga's analogical argument for the Defeater Thesis 
is successful. First, we must show that the evolutionary naturalist cannot 
believe in an internally rational fashion that her belief in R is warranted 
due to its being produced in a basic way. Second, we must show that the 
evolutionary naturalist cannot believe in an internally rational fashion that 
her belief in R is warranted due to its being produced via a highly reliable 
faculty of inductive inference. But, again, we have yet to do either of these; 
and, until we have, Plantinga's argument against evolutionary naturalism 
will remain, at best, incomplete.9 
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NOTES 
1. See Plantinga's Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford 1993. (WPF), 
Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford 2000. (WCB), "Naturalism Defeated", unpub-
lished manuscript. (ND). 
2. The Probability Thesis has received a fair bit of attention in the litera-
ture. See, for example Evan Fales' "Plantinga's Case Against Naturalistic 
Epistemology", Philosophy of Science, 63 (3), September 1996, pp. 432-51; and, 
Fitelson and Sober's "Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary 
Naturalism", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998), pp. 115-29. 
3. This example is due to John Pollock in his Contemporary Theories of 
Knowledge, Rowman Littlefield: 1986. 
4. Principle LR' identifies that there is a defeater, but does not identify what 
it is. According to Plantinga's definition of a defeater, a defeater must always be 
a belief (or perhaps some other epistemic state?). (WeB 363) In the case at hand 
it would be consistent with Plantinga's definition to say that the defeater was the 
belief that the superintendent had said that her color detecting faculties were 
unreliable and that she did not know whether or not to trust him on this matter. 
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5. This is a more general statement of a principle that Plantinga offers 
(although not in this exact form): If agent S believes that one of her beliefs B 
requires reasons if it is to be accepted rationally, and believes that she has no 
reasons to accept B, then she has a defeater for her belief B. (see ND 28) 
6. For a defense of this view, however, see Michael Bergmann's 
"Commonsense Naturalism", in Beilby & Peressini's Naturalism Defeated? 
Essays On Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, Cornell 
University Press, forthcoming. 
7. Alston rejects epistemically circular arguments (see pp. 15-16 in his The 
Reliability of Sense Perception, Cornell 1993) and acknowledges the skeptical 
implications this rejection carries. We can at best, he says, find practical reasons 
for believing our basic faculties to be justified; we cannot, however, find epis-
temic reasons for believing that this is so. See p. 133. 
8. A better way of putting this point would be this: "An epistemically cir-
cular argument for belief B is epistemically unacceptable if B already faces a 
potential or actual defeater; however, the epistemic circularity of an argument 
for B is not a problem if B does not already face a potential or actual defeater." 
To understand the distinction between potential and actual defeaters see WCB, 
p.360. Up to this point whenever I have spoken of a 'defeater' I meant to refer 
to an actual defeater. 
9. I am grateful to my colleagues Fred Adams, Jeffrey Jordan, Joel Pust 
and Michael Rea for helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to 
thank an anonymous referee of this journal for helping me to improve the 
paper. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Alvin Plantinga. I 
know him almost exclusively from his written work; I nonetheless view him as 
my teacher. 
